If there has been a somewhat meagre development of legal principles that apply to covenants running with land in New Jersey, no one will question the fullness of the equitable principles that have been wrought and applied to them by the courts of equity.
It has been said that the office and operation of the usual covenants for title are personal, binding the representatives of the covenantor, and that they are not real covenants in the sense of the ancient feudal law. This is especially true of three of them: that the grantor is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has a good right to convey them; and that they are free from encumbrances. They do not run with the land nor pass the title to the assignee. They are in language de presenti, and, if not true, are broken as soon as they are made. The two remaining covenants-that the grantee shall enjoy the premises, and that the grantor will warrant and defend the title-are prospective, and are therefore real covenants which run with the land conveyed, and descend to heirs and assignees.' A warranty attaches only to the estate granted, or purported to be granted. Thus a warranty attached to a life estate cannot enlarge the estate which was granted, even though it warrant the land to the life tenant and his heirs general. L. 20 (1828) ; see Lot v. Thomas Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio 211 (1827) ; Great Western Stock Co. v. Saas, 24 Ohio St. 542 (1874) .
that the burden of such a covenant, if regarded as a covenant, would not in law run with the land nor bind the alienee in any case except that of landlord and tenant. The covenant in the deed was construed as one inter partes, with A individually, for his personal indemnity. In another case a tunnel company covenanted with a railroad company that it would not institute condemnation proceedings under any specified land belonging to the railroad company. The covenant was held not to run with the land, and therefore it was not binding on the successor of the tunnel company.' 0 A covenant by a mortgagor to insure the mortgaged land for the benefit of the mortgagee is a personal covenant not running with the land."
A covenant for the maintenance of a railroad crossing will run with the land and will enure to the benefit of the heirs of the grantor. Once located, the crossing cannot be changed save by mutual consent; nor will the court give something as a substitute unless the railroad can show that, under the special conditions of the case, the enforcement of the legal right would be inequi- which coincided not only with the general rule, but also with the statutes of many states. Whether a covenant is of a proper nature to run with the land is a pure question of law, to be decided by the court. The question is not one of the intention of the covenanting parties, regardless of their lawful inclination. Accordingly, ever since Lord Brougham's day, the courts have reiterated his well known declaration that covenantors are not free to invent any covenants that their imagination or caprice may contrive 15-a rule approved by the courts in this state. Thus in Brewer v. Marshall': a covenant by a grantor of land, that neither he nor his assigns would sell any marl from the premises adjoining the land sold, could not be enforced against an alienee whom the grantor sought to burden with the covenant. Said Chief Justice Beasley:
.. . the covenant in question appears to be destitute of all the essentials of a legal agreement . . . I cannot say that the covenant is legal, anymore than I can say that a covenant on the part of a farmer not to sell, nor permit any of the future owners of his farm to sell, any grain to be grown on his farm, would be legal." 17 Another question, in the process of settlement in other jurisdictions, has long been settled in New Jersey. A deed poll, accepted by the proper parties, is regarded as a covenant, as much so as if signed and sealed by both of them.' 8 While in some states the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments has been abolished by statute, 19 A covenant need not have the precision of form required in former days. Any words that clearly express the intention of the covenantors will be sufficient. 24 A covenant that the grantor "will warrant and forever defend the premises against all lawful claims freed and discharged of all encumbrances", is not only a covenant against encumbrances, but is also a general warranty. 25 Likewise the purpose of a grantor, with whom a restrictive covenant is made, can be evidenced by the language in the covenant itself, or by other language in the deed. 26 The importance of the use or omission of the word assigns still lingers in some judicial minds. 
388.

32
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW cer's Case 27 have darkened rather than lightened the path of inquiry. The modern decisions are far less confusing. If a covenant does not touch or concern the land, but is merely collateral, it is personal, 2 8 even though the covenanting parties have clearly expressed their intention that the covenant should run with the land. 2 9 On the other hand, if the covenant does touch or concern the land, whether or not it pertains to a thing in esse, the use of the word assigns is not essential for the covenant to run with the land.a° Its omission is simply evidence of the intention of the covenantors, but is not decisive. 3 1 A covenant in which a lessor covenants with the lessee, without mentioning the lessee's assigns, to pay for the value of substituted machinery at the end of the term, enures to the benefit of the assignee of the tenant. Such improvements are a lien on the premises, which equity will enforce.
If it be doubtful whether a clause in a deed is intended as a covenant or as a condition, the clause should be construed as a covenant, for the legal consequences of a broken condition are much greater than those of a broken covenant.
Since the covenant runs with the land, it is immaterial whether it pass by a deed from the grantor or from a judicial officer properly authorized to convey it. By statute a sheriff's deed passes all the interest of the mortgagor at the date of the mortgage, or, if made under a judgment at law, the deed passes 
Eq. 51 (1864).
29 Ibid. Eq. 349, 16 Ati. 4 (1888) .
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all his interest at the time of its rendition. He is as much the assignee of the covenant as though the conveyance was made by the covenantee himself. 36 Moreover, an assignee who is evicted may maintain a personal action of covenant against the executors of the grantor. He need not aver that notice of the pendency of the suit, which effected the plaintiff's eviction, was given to the defendant ;3s nor need he be described as assignee. 3 9 The declaration must, of course, describe the land with convenient certainty.
While the courts must determine, as a matter of law, whether a covenant does touch and concern the land, they regard with more favor than formerly the interpretation put by covenantors on their engagements. Chief Justice Beasley said:
while it is plain that a mere personal covenant cannot, by the agreement of parties, have its nature so altered as to make it transmissible with land, nevertheless when the question is whether the given covenant does concern certain premises, the fact that such parties considered it to have such quality, should be potent in a decision of the inquiry." 40 The covenant by the vendor in this case, attached to a deed of land and a bank building thereon, was that he would not engage in the business of banking in that locality. This was regarded as a benefit to the estate conveyed and ran with the land.
After a breach of the covenant of warranty it no longer runs with the land, but becomes a mere chose in action. By the ancient law this was not assignable, 4 but it is now by statute. 42 If the land is sold after a breach of the covenant, the right of action does not pass to the purchaser; it still belongs to the owner 66 Atl. 591 (19o7) .. at the time the breach occurred.
4 3 The right of action does not arise unless there has been either eviction by title paramount or action brought ;44 nor does the mere existence of a right to recover nominal damages on a covenant against encumbrances prevent a recovery of substantial damages on a covenant of warranty after a subsequent eviction.
5
While a cause of action for breach of a covenant against encumbrance is separate and distinct from a cause of action for a breach of warranty, the two covenants may be in the same instrument.
4 ' Again, though a deed is inter partes, a covenant therein made with a third person may be enforced by him if it clearly appears that it is the intention of the parties to confer this right ;47 formerly this right was denied him. 48 Before considering the relief afforded by courts of equity to parties who have entered into covenants running with land, some discussion of the principles of implied covenants is necessary. If land conveyed is located by a highway, in equity there is an implied covenant that the land in the highway, subject to the public easement, is appurtenant to that specified in the deed of conveyance. This conception of an implied covenant has been fully set forth by Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, in Coudert v. Sayre: . ..when it appears by the true construction of the terms of a grant that it was the well-understood purpose of the parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature of a servitude or easement, in the property granted, for the benefit of other land owned by the grantor, no matter in what form such purpose may be expressed-such right, if not against public policy, will be held to be appurtenant to the land of the grantor, and binding on that conveyed to the The right and burden thus created pass with the land to all subsequent grantees, and every grantee of land to which such right is appurtenant is entitled in equity to protection, "notwithstanding that his right may not rest on a covenant which, as a matter of law runs with the title to his land . . . "50
Equity extends its protecting wings in another direction.
Even though a covenant may not run with the land, or an easement relation may not exist, equity will compel the performance of a covenant known to the party who in justice ought to perform it. 51 After reviewing several decisions in which relief was granted, Chief Justice Beasley, in Brewer v. Marshalli 2 remarked that the courts proceed on the principle of preventing a party having knowledge of the rights of another from defeating them.
Consequently: ". . . a court of equity will sometimes impose the burden of a covenant relating to lands on the alienee of such lands on a principle altogether aside from the existence of an easement or the capacity of such covenant to adhere to the title." 53 A still more important application of this principle occurs in the many cases involving land improvement schemes. 54 The most general principle applied to them was formulated, in the familiar Monmouth Beach case, by Vice-Chancellor Green: At. 618, 621 (1925) .
" . a court of equity will restrain the violation of a covenant, entered into by a grantee, restrictive of the use of lands conveyed, not only against the covenantor but against all subsequent purchasers of the land with notice of the covenant, irrespective of the questions whether the covenant is of a nature to run with the land or whether it creates an easement; provided, however, that its enforcement is not against public policy." 55 "Restrictions of this character", said Chief Justice Depue, "are valid, and are regarded as for the benefit of the owners of the tract to be improved and made profitable by sales of lots, and also for the advantage of persons who have become purchasers on the faith of the scheme of improvem ent .
, 56
In applying this principle, therefore, the right of the owner of a lot to enforce a restrictive covenant, on the use of another lot, entered into between former owners, depends primarily on whether the covenant was made for the benefit of the land embraced in the owner's lot. While this can be done in equity, in law the purchaser of one of such lots from the grantee could not enforce the covenant against the purchaser of another of them.
5 7 The common scheme, to be effective in equity, must be strictly preserved. 58 It must be universal and reciprocal. The same restrictions must be imposed upon all lots similarly situated. If they are not alike, or some lots are not subject to restrictions, while others are, the scheme fails.
"It is only when there is a general plan imposed upon the lands sold, under which each purchaser buys, that a prior purchaser may enforce the restriction against a subsequent purchaser who violates it." 59 DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 5o N. J. Eq 
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A covenant or agreement restricting the use of land in favor of other lands creates an easement that makes one of the lands subservient and the other dominant. "All that is necessary", says Chief Justice Gummere, "to create such an easement is a clear manifestation of the intention of the person who is the source of title to subject one parcel of land to a restriction in its use for the benefit of another, and efficient language to make that restriction perpetual." 60 Again, a covenant prescribing the mode of improving land, and restraining the use of it, does not violate any rule of law when the restriction is reasonable, and the party in whose favor it is made, or those in privity with him, is interested in the subject matter of the restriction. 6 ' A restriction may therefore be applied to land used and operated as an elevated railroad.
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Moreover, if, in a general land improvement scheme, some of the lots are set apart for specified purposes, such as parks, which are regarded as an advantage to all purchasers of lots, there is an implied covenant with them that such lots shall retain their special character.
6 3 Each purchaser of a lot, or his grantees, may enforce the easement against the grantor, or his grantees who purchased with notice of the implied covenant.6 4 He may also enforce it against the donee of the covenantor who accepts as a gift a conveyance of part of the land charged with the covenant. On the other hand, one who divides his land into lots and streets as shown by a public map, if no neighborhood scheme exists calling Restrictions in the conveyance must be incorporated by the common grantor in every deed to the lots sold under the general scheme. Ferraro v. Zozlowski, 138 Atl. 197 Atl. 1130 (19o2) .
"Ibid. Bridgewater v. Ocean City R. R., supra note 63.
for the erection of one building only on a lot, does not impliedly covenant that he will not subdivide the lots into smaller parcels. 66 Finally, restrictions in a general land improvement scheme may in equity be imposed on lands beyond the express restrictions contained in deeds to purchasers, on the theory of an implied covenant. 6 7 By way of further defining the rights of covenanting parties, in a plan forming a general land scheme, Vice-Chancellor Grey has remarked that:
"The parties who may enforce such restrictive covenants are the original grantors with whom they were made, and all subsequent purchasers of the lands to be benefited by them. The parties against whom they may be enforced are the grantees who accept deeds containing the restrictions, and all those who subsequently purchase the restricted lands with notice of the covenant." 68
Consequently if an owner sells a portion of his land with a covenant restricting its use, a subsequent grantee of another portion from the same owner may enforce the covenant against the original grantee and against all subsequent purchasers with notice from him. 69 On the other hand, a prior purchaser from the original owner cannot enforce a restriction imposed by the latter upon a lot subsequently conveyed, unless in the prior deed there was a grant of a right in the residue of the land retained by the vendor; 70 or a stipulation that the restrictions put upon the lot sold by the prior deed should also be imposed upon the remaining property when making sales to subsequent purchasers, or in some other way indicating that all the lots sold are parts of a uniform scheme. 71 Again, a grantee, whose deed is subsequent to the imposition of a restrictive covenant on land of the grantor, can enforce the covenant against a prior grantee of another lot, but a prior grantee can only enforce it where the purpose of the covenant is to carry out a general plan or scheme for the development of all the original grantor's property.
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The right to enforce a restriction in a deed, made for the benefit of the vendor's remaining land, passes to a subsequent grantee of the vendor. 7 3 But if a deed containing a restrictive covenant is made subsequent to a deed of other property owned by the same vendor, the grantee in the prior deed does not take the land with the benefit of such restrictive covenant.r 4 "There can be little, if any, difference in principle", says Vice-Chancellor Learning, "between a restrictive covenant made by a vendee for the benefit of remaining land of his vendor, and one made by a vendor touching his remaining land for the benefit of his vendee. Both are held to be enforceable by a purchaser of the land, for the benefit of which the covenant has been made, against a purchaser of the restricted land who is chargeable with notice of the cov-
Furthermore, if in a land improvement scheme, a mortgage is created containing the covenant that, after part payment, a part of the land mortgaged may be released, the benefits of the covenant should be regarded as running with the land and passing with it to a grantee of the mortgagor, even though it is not specifically stated that the covenant is for the benefit of the assigns of the mortgagor. The original grantor, in imposing a covenant upon the grantee, may or may not bind himself. If he does not, the grantee, having no right of action against him, cannot pursue any other grantee to whom the grantor may convey the whole, or a part, of the remaining land. Again, after a deed has been made, the grantee cannot get the benefit of restrictions which the grantor has seen fit to insert in subsequent conveyances.
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A covenant restricting the lawful use of land by the owner must be strictly construed; "I doubtful restrictions will not be enforced. 7 9 They must be clear and unambiguous; 80 otherwise the courts will refuse to enforce them.
8
An exception, limiting the scope and effect of a restrictive covenant, should have a liberal construction.
2
An exception may in some instances have the practical effect of enlarging, by explaining, an otherwise ambiguous restrictive covenant, or one of doubtful meaning. Its ordinary province is to limit or detract from, rather than to enlarge, the scope of the covenant to which it is attached. s Of course, an injunction will not be granted if no restrictive covenant exists.
84
A common grantor, who has parted with the title to a portion of his land, for the benefit of which a restrictive covenant had been imposed on other land previously conveyed by him, cannot thereafter release or modify the covenant, to the injury of the grantee of the benefited property.
8 5 In other words, a grantor's release of a restrictive covenant does not preclude other parties, to whom he had conveyed lots, from enforcing their rights against any purchaser violating the restriction."
A restrictive covenant may be abandoned. This is a favorite defense of transgressors who seek to destroy or terminate restrictions. The equitable right to enforce them may be lost by a degree of acquiescence in their violations amounting to an abandonment of the right of enforcement. 8 7 If in a general or neighborhood scheme, the parties in interest, by express acts or passive acquiescence, permit such violations of the plan or scheme as destroy, wholly o' partially, the benefit from it, they absolve each other, to a corresponding extent, from its burdens. 8 It is the mutual benefit accruing to all and to each which makes it inequitable for any one so benefited to repudiate the burden, to the injury of the others. 8 9 How many violations of restrictions will operate as an abandonment? The inquiry in each case evidently is largely an isolated one. It has been held that several violations of a covenant, which in no substantial way affected the value and worth of the property, were no indication of the abandonment of a general scheme of land improvement. 0 A few violations of a restrictive covenant has often been held to be no bar to injunctive relief. 91 Indeed, a small number of violations in a large scheme of development has been regarded as indicative of a general adherence to the plan. 92 On the other hand, a covenantee may not enforce in equity a restrictive covenant in a general land improvement scheme, after he has failed to exercise the right for a considerable time, and many buildings have been erected contrary to the provisions of the covenant. The covenantee's remedy is then limited to an action at law. 9 3 Moreover, an injunction will not be issued to a I Chelsea Land & Imp. Co. v. Adams In abandoning restrictions, several questions arise: First, what action by the original owner of lots will have the effect of an abandonment? If he knowingly permits some of the grantees to violate the restrictions, which are intended to conserve the general purpose of the scheme, he cannot enforce them against one grantee." The building of a few bay windows over the line does not work an abandonment. 6 In one of the cases, the complainant and his predecessor owned lots on which there was a restrictive building line. The restriction was incorporated in the deeds of more than one hundred and fifty purchasers, one hundred of whom had violated it. No action was taken to enforce the restriction, save on a single occasion. It was held that the plan had been abandoned and could not be enforced. Said Vice-Chancellor Bergen:
"I think that all persons occupying these lands are entitled to be treated alike, and this complainant company cannot undertake to waive violations of these restrictions in so universal a manner as it is proved has been done here, and then undertake to enforce it against one other of their purchasers. Such a general consent to the non-observance of restrictive covenants amounts to an abandonment of the original intention and design with regard to restrictions." 97 Again, when a plan of restrictions has been so changed by altering them in subsequent deeds, for lots similarly located, that the enforcement of the original restrictions would be a burden on the restricted lots, without conferring any appreciable benefit on the lots of those seeking to enforce them, equity will decline to act. On the other hand, if some of the grantees violate them without the grantor's knowledge, his right to enforce the restrictions is not lost. The effect of his conduct with respect to the known or unknown violation of them can hardly be determined by precedent, but rather by inquiry whenever the question arises. This much is doubtless true, that:
"Where the restrictions are not universal, or after frequent violation of the restrictions have been permitted, then the neighborhood scheme will be considered abandoned." 91
The second question is: What action by the grantees may work an abandonment of the scheme? Evidently one owner of lots cannot accomplish this purpose. How many must conspire to effect this end? In other words, can such a scheme be disrupted by the action of any number of the lot owners less than all of them; and if so, how many, by their combined action, whether acting in concert or individually, can do it? Surely the original owner of a land improvement scheme cannot abandon or release any restrictions he may have imposed for the benefit of all subsequent purchasers of lots, without their acquiescence. 0 Clearly, a complainant is not estopped from opposing the erection of a garage that is within a restriction, because other lot owners in the vicinity, subject to the same restriction, violated their covenant. 10 Thus A was a resident in a land scheme which prohibited flat roofs on any buildings. Notwithstanding the restriction, many of them had flat roofs, and A knew of the restriction. Its violation by others did not justify A in violating it, and as the complainant acted promptly, A was required to comply with the restriction."' 1 It may be difficult in some cases to decide whether there has been a known and wilful violation of a restrictive covenant, or 'Scull v. Eilenberg, 94 N. J. Eq. 759, 763, i21 Atl. 788, 79o (9z3) ; see Laverack v. Allen, 13o At!. 615, 616 (N. J. Eq. 1924 ).
,o Barton v. Slifer, supra note 54. " Kumble v. Jaffee, ioo N. J. Eq. 29o, 134 Atl. 673 (1926) . 'Durham Essex Corp. v. Schaffer, 99 N. J. Eq. 6o2, 133 At. 754 (1926) .
simply an innocent mistake. In the latter case, damages are regarded as an adequate compensation for the wrong, and a mandatory injunction will not be granted." 0 2 Again, if the benefits of restrictions on lots forming a land improvement scheme are partly or totally destroyed by violation of the plan or restrictions, the accompanying burden is correspondingly modified. 0 3 However, when changes do not conflict with the essential purpose of the plan and covenants, the benefit is unimpaired, and a violation of the restrictions will be enjoined.. A restrictive covenant outside a general land scheme will not be enforced when the grantor himself has manifested a disregard of its provisions, and intends to abandon it.' 0 5 Thus the Duke of Bedford, after imposing restrictions on the use of land sold by him, violated the spirit and intent of his covenant by erecting a greenhouse and dwelling on the land retained. Lord Eldon would not enforce the covenant against the other party, after such a plain violation of its spirit and intent by the Duke himself. 10 6 An abandonment may be effected by such a change in the condition of the neighborhood, after the adoption of the scheme, that its original purpose can no longer be continued. 0 7 The well known Thacher case is perhaps the pioneer in establishing this rule.' 0 8 A change in the use of a part of the land which is subject to restrictions does not have the effect of destroying them on the remainder. 10 9 A covenanting party, to be bound by restrictions, must have notice of them. When he has such notice, he cannot avoid their
